Playing with Scorpions: Turkey and the Syrian rebels

Every nation that plays with scorpions gets stung by them.

Since the fall of the Shah of Iran, jihadist rebels have been the US' main proxy force in the Middle-East. In the 1980's, the US helped fund the mujahideen to overthrow the Communist regime in Afghanistan. During the Arab Spring, jihadist rebels were used in the wars in Libya and Syria to defeat regime forces.

But during each of these wars the jihadist rebels ended up turning on their main backer - the United States - and her allied nations. Funding the mujahideen in Afghanistan was largely responsible for 9-11 and directly resulted in the rise of Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban, the regime dominant in Afghanistan from the 1990's until now, allied with Al-Qaeda and turned its weapons on neighbouring Pakistan, who largely smuggled rebels next door.

But Libya and Syria in the early 2010's were a particularly worrying combination. After the overthrow of Moammar Al-Qaddafi, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton organised the plunder of Libya and sent Qaddafi's large munitions reserves and jihadist rebels from Libya into Syria, via Turkey. This resulted in an increasing amount of bloodshed in Syria and also contributed to the drastic rise of ISIS in neighbouring Iraq, next door. To borrow a phrase from Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, "Terrorism is like a scorpion, if you put it in your pocket, it will sting you."

For Turkey, the worst may be yet to come. Since the Russian intervention in 2015, Syrian rebels have been defeated, province by province, and moved into Idlib, a Syrian province bordering Turkey. As Russian, Iranian and Syrian forces defeat the rebels in Idlib, more and more of these rebels are finding themselves in Turkey. The attempted coup in 2016 against Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan highlights the level of instability faced by Turkey through its support of jihadist rebels.

But intriguingly, Turkey has decided to double down on its jihadist approach. It has decided not to turn on the Syrian rebels within its own borders and is, instead, using the Syrian rebels to further its own geostrategic aims. This has largely nullified the jihadist threat to Turkey - at least for now.

Turkey has been using the rebels to invade Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria, greatly weakening the United States' influence there. But once Russia has liberated the remaining half of Idlib from Syrian rebels and once the United States has withdrawn its troops from eastern Syria, Russia and Syria will not tolerate the remaining Syrian rebel presence in Kurdish areas, and will move to push Turkey out of Syria.

Fortunately for Turkey, the arrangement in Syria has not been one-sided. Both Presidents Putin and Erdogan have their own strategies involving compromise in Syria for larger geostrategic goals. For Russia, Turkish cooperation in Syria means that Turkey will have a freer hand in intervening in both Libya and Yemen. These interventions give the defeated rebels another destination that doesn't involve instability in Turkey from Syria.

For the United States, turning a blind eye to Turkish malevolence in Libya and Yemen has distinct advantages. Jihadist rebels used in Libya not only increases the likelihood for stability in Turkey; it also means that, although Israel would lose an Arab ally in Haftar, Egypt would be forced to remain dependent on the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel in the face of a Libya strongly supported by Turkey.

In Yemen, Turkey-backed rebels from Syria and Libya would very likely take Sana'a from the Houthis, which would give the US a key win over Iran in the region. Even in the likelihood that the rebels would turn on the UAE in Southern Yemen and, as in Libya, weaken Arab autocracy, the UAE and Saudi Arabia would be forced more than ever to back US interests in Iraq and help drive Iran out of Iraq for good.

However, there is one major problem for the United States in letting Libya and Yemen fall into Turkish hands. Even should the US gain more hegemony in driving Iraq away from Iran, Saudi Arabia would be very likely to erupt in instability, pitting the rebels Saudi Arabia once funded in Syria against its own Mohammed Bin Salman. In the ensuing chaos, Saudi Arabia would become as unrecognizable as Syria has been, and the US and Israel in particular would see the true colours of Turkey at last.

Will Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia recalculate their views on Bashar Al-Assad?

The rumbling of the Turkish war machine in support of the GNA in Libya is likely to have an increasingly profound impact on the region.

Chief among these is in Syria. In a previous article it has already been suggested that a Russian-Turkish grand bargain is in the works, giving Turkey Libya and in exchange Syria and Russia being allowed to clear Idlib of rebels loosely backed by Turkey:

https://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2020/05/libyas-place-in-cold-war-2.html

Should this grand bargain between Turkey and Russia be fulfilled, Egypt's Abdul Feteh As-Sisi would be unable to invade eastern Libya to support his ally, Haftar Al-Khalifa, as he would receive no support from Russia and only lip-service from the United States. This would have an impact not only on Egypt, but on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well, who have previously backed Haftar.

This autocratic Sunni wing of the Middle-East - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt - would be caught on the back foot and would have to shift its regional alliances to counter the growing Turkish threat. First and foremost, they would be more likely to turn their attention to Syria and change their collective stance on Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

Although at differing stages Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have called for President Assad to step down, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have had regime changes in favour of the UAE's autocratic policy. For Egypt, Abdul Feteh As-Sisi coming to power restored Egyptian ties with Syria. For Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has at times suggested that President Assad could stay in power, provided that there were a reduction in Iranian influence.

Iranian influence is waning in the region largely due to President Trump's approach to the regime. Wide-scale protests in Lebanon and Iraq show that US sanctions on Iran are working and, eventually, point to regime change unfavourable to Iran at least in Iraq. Because of this, the nations of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East might be more concerned with containing Turkey than containing Iran.

For Egypt, this lends itself to a military solution in Syria, on the side of Russia and Syria and against Turkey. Correspondingly, for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this would mean defending Egypt's military moves diplomatically from potential United States' sanctions.

The reason President Sisi would want to intervene in Syria would be to show to its people that, in some way, it is prepared to defeat Turkish influence in the Middle-East. In fact, it is even likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin is well aware that a Turkish-controlled Libya would propel the autocratic wing of the Sunni Middle-East to align more closely with its own vision for Syria.

This realignment would seal the fate of the Syrian rebels in Idlib. Egypt would lend Bashar Al-Assad the legitimacy he needs to return to a member of the Arab League, and Egypt would also be intervening in a war nearing its end, rather than beginning a new war to its west in Libya. It would also show Israel that President Sisi is not merely a puppet and is capable of fighting with pro-Palestinian nations like Syria.

But most of all, it would be an important distraction for Egypt from Libya being controlled by a Turkish ally. Egypt would also reap the rewards of humiliating Turkey in a war more and more likely to be won by Russia and President Assad.