Will Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia recalculate their views on Bashar Al-Assad?

The rumbling of the Turkish war machine in support of the GNA in Libya is likely to have an increasingly profound impact on the region.

Chief among these is in Syria. In a previous article it has already been suggested that a Russian-Turkish grand bargain is in the works, giving Turkey Libya and in exchange Syria and Russia being allowed to clear Idlib of rebels loosely backed by Turkey:

https://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2020/05/libyas-place-in-cold-war-2.html

Should this grand bargain between Turkey and Russia be fulfilled, Egypt's Abdul Feteh As-Sisi would be unable to invade eastern Libya to support his ally, Haftar Al-Khalifa, as he would receive no support from Russia and only lip-service from the United States. This would have an impact not only on Egypt, but on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well, who have previously backed Haftar.

This autocratic Sunni wing of the Middle-East - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt - would be caught on the back foot and would have to shift its regional alliances to counter the growing Turkish threat. First and foremost, they would be more likely to turn their attention to Syria and change their collective stance on Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

Although at differing stages Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have called for President Assad to step down, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have had regime changes in favour of the UAE's autocratic policy. For Egypt, Abdul Feteh As-Sisi coming to power restored Egyptian ties with Syria. For Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has at times suggested that President Assad could stay in power, provided that there were a reduction in Iranian influence.

Iranian influence is waning in the region largely due to President Trump's approach to the regime. Wide-scale protests in Lebanon and Iraq show that US sanctions on Iran are working and, eventually, point to regime change unfavourable to Iran at least in Iraq. Because of this, the nations of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East might be more concerned with containing Turkey than containing Iran.

For Egypt, this lends itself to a military solution in Syria, on the side of Russia and Syria and against Turkey. Correspondingly, for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this would mean defending Egypt's military moves diplomatically from potential United States' sanctions.

The reason President Sisi would want to intervene in Syria would be to show to its people that, in some way, it is prepared to defeat Turkish influence in the Middle-East. In fact, it is even likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin is well aware that a Turkish-controlled Libya would propel the autocratic wing of the Sunni Middle-East to align more closely with its own vision for Syria.

This realignment would seal the fate of the Syrian rebels in Idlib. Egypt would lend Bashar Al-Assad the legitimacy he needs to return to a member of the Arab League, and Egypt would also be intervening in a war nearing its end, rather than beginning a new war to its west in Libya. It would also show Israel that President Sisi is not merely a puppet and is capable of fighting with pro-Palestinian nations like Syria.

But most of all, it would be an important distraction for Egypt from Libya being controlled by a Turkish ally. Egypt would also reap the rewards of humiliating Turkey in a war more and more likely to be won by Russia and President Assad.